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Academic research and policy discussions have noted a tendency toward greater 
decentralization in the structure of collective bargaining in many countries in 
recent years. Previously unexamined is whether the structure of bargaining and 
union structure or changes in those structures affect strike frequency. This paper 
argues that more fragmented bargaining and union structures affect the frequency 
of strikes. Increased fragmentation in bargaining and union structures can make 
it more difficult for labor and management to understand each others’ interests 
and thereby increase the likelihood of miscalculation in collective bargaining.  Data 
from Korea is used both to develop novel measures of bargaining and union 
structure (and the degree of fragmentation in those structures) and strike 
frequency. The data and statistical analysis provide substantial evidence of an 
association between the degree of concentration in national-level unions and strike 
activity. In particular, regression analysis indicates that the greater is union 
monopoly (concentration) at the national level, the lower is industrial conflict.
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INTRODUCTION
Academic research and policy discussions have noted a tendency 
toward greater decentralization in the structure of collective bargaining 
in many countries in recent years (Katz, 1983; Katz and Darbishire, 
2002). There also has been discussion of the extent to which the 
structure of bargaining influences inflation and macroeconomic 
performance (Calmfors and Driffill, 1988; Golden, 1993; Golden, 
Wallerstein and Lange, 1999). Previously unexamined is whether the 
structures of bargaining and union, or changes in those structures, affect 
strike frequency. 
This paper argues that more fragmented bargaining and union 
structures affect the frequency of strikes. Increased fragmentation in 
bargaining and union structures can make it more difficult for labor and 
management to understand each others’ interests and thereby increase 
the likelihood of miscalculation in collective bargaining. Following 
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Hicks’ classic model of strikes, increased miscalculation will lead to 
greater strike frequency (Hicks, 1932).
We use data from Korea both to develop novel measures of 
bargaining and union structure (and the degree of fragmentation in 
those structures) and strike frequency. Over the past 25 years Korea has 
experienced substantial shifts in the structure of collective bargaining 
and the structure of union representation, and there have been periods 
of heated union militancy. Korea thereby provides a convenient “natural 
experiment” that can be used to statistically test the relationship 
between bargaining and union structure and strike frequency.
AN OVERVIEW OF THE STRUCTURE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
AND UNION FRAGMENTATION IN KOREA 
Compared to other countries, the structure of collective bargaining in 
Korea is relatively decentralized, with almost all bargaining occurring at 
the company level. In Korea, only one union and one employer can 
conclude a collective agreement on the issues of industrial relations. 
Moreover, for many years the military government (the Chun Doo 
Hwan regime) prohibited third party (i.e., union) intervention in 
collective bargaining. 
Union structure also is highly decentralized in Korea as enterprise 
unions represent most blue-collar employees in a single firm, regardless 
of occupation or job, and sometimes these unions include white-collar 
workers when firms include professional workers, such as journalists, 
researchers, or hospital employees.
The enterprise unions are commonly associated with industry-level 
union federations, which, in turn, are affiliated with national 
confederations (FKTU or KCTU). Employers commonly belong to 
counterpart federations, the employer federations (Kyung-Chong). Both 
union and employer federations provide advice to their members and 
engage in political lobbying, but do not become directly involved in 
enterprise-level collective bargaining. In most collective bargaining, pay 
agreements (imhyop) are set in annual negotiations that occur between 
a firm and the enterprise union, and other issues (danhyop) are 
established in every other year agreements.
Although industrial or general unions are rare in Korea, industry- 
level collective bargaining started to occur in several sectors after the 
1997 Asian financial crisis. Those sectors include the banking sector (the 
Korean Financial Industry Union), hospital workers (the Korean Health 
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TABLE 1. THE STRUCTURE OF KCTU UNION REPRESENTATION (2004 & 2005)
Source: KCTU official homepage (http://www.nodong.org/)
and Medical Workers Union) and metal workers (the Korean Metal 
Workers Union).  Some observers claim that there is a tendency toward 
an upward shift in the formal structure of bargaining and a consequent 
increase in the frequency of industry-level bargaining (Lee and Lee, 
2003). Yet, Table 1 reports figures on the structure of KCTU-affiliated 
unions and shows the predominance of enterprise unions. 
Although centralized negotiations have been reported in several 
industry-level bargaining in recent years, our reading of the evidence 
suggests that there is very little evidence of the emergence of stable 
industry-level bargaining. In assessing changes in the structure of 
collective bargaining, it is important to keep in mind that 
deunionization represents an extreme form (perhaps the ultimate form) 
of bargaining structure decentralization. As unionization declines, fewer 
workers are covered by any sort of labor contract. Unorganized 
employees have their employment conditions determined either 
exclusively by employers or through individual (formal or informal) 
bargains in the market. 
Over the several decades in the Figure 1, union density declined 
substantially after peaking in 1989. Although union density increased 
slightly after the economic crisis in 1997, this mostly reflected 
“legalization” of the previously illegal unions. (Kim, 2006). As a result, 
Korean developments overall are consistent with the movement toward 
greater decentralization in the structure of collective bargaining found 
in many countries. 
Another key aspect of union structure is the degree of union 
Organization
Number of Unions Union Members
Percentage of 
Membership (%)
2004 2005 2004 2005 2004 2005
Enterprise 
Union
625 621 315,536 345,568 50.9 55.1
Industry-level 
Union
35 31 293,347 282,116 47.4 43.2
Local Union 84 90 10,521 10,499 1.7 1.7
Total 744 742 619,204 627,684 100.0 100.0
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concentration, that is, the monopoly structure of workers’ representation. 
Union concentration indicates the degree of organizational cohesion. 
ORGANIZATIONAL FRAGMENTATION AND COORDINATION 
PROBLEM
within the labor movement as it affects the extent to which unions can 
coordinate intra- or inter-organizational conflicts. Union concentration 
indicates the ability of unions, especially national confederation or 
industrial unions, to dominate decision making between or within 
union organizations. In principle, the smaller the number of actors is, 
the easier it is to prevent inter-or intra-organizational conflicts. It is 
expected that the greater the degree of intra- or inter-organizational 
conflicts within unions is, the more likely in turn is union-management 
conflict.  
To measure the degree of union concentration, we assess both the 
number of national and industrial federations. Union concentration is 
measured by both the number of union federations (C1 & C2 in Table 
2) and the membership of these federations. Membership is assessed 
both in terms of the absolute value of union membership (C3 & C4 in 
Table 2) and the relative importance (C3-1 and C4-1 in Table 2) of the 
we measure union concentration by (1) the number of confederations 
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TABLE 2. UNION CONCENTRATION INDEX
C1: N of Confederations, C2: N of Industrial Federations, C3: Size of C1, C3-1: 
C3/Membership, C4: Size of C2, C4-1: C4/Membership
Year Unions Density C1 C2 Membership C3 C3-1 C4 C4-1 Union size
1970 3500 20.0 1 17 473,259 473,259.0 1.0 27,838.8 0.059 135.2 
1971 3525 19.7 1 17 497,221 497,221.0 1.0 29,248.3 0.059 141.1 
1972 3409 20.4 1 17 515,292 515,292.0 1.0 30,311.3 0.059 151.2 
1973 3286 20.4 1 17 548,054 548,054.0 1.0 32,238.5 0.059 166.8 
1974 3802 22.1 1 17 655,785 655,785.0 1.0 38,575.6 0.059 172.5 
1975 4091 23.0 1 17 750,235 750,235.0 1.0 44,131.5 0.059 183.4 
1976 4389 23.3 1 17 845,630 845,630.0 1.0 49,742.9 0.059 192.7 
1977 4598 24.3 1 17 954,727 954,727.0 1.0 56,160.4 0.059 207.6 
1978 4875 24.0 1 17 1,054,608 1,054,608.0 1.0 62,035.8 0.059 216.3 
1979 4965 23.6 1 17 1,088,061 1,088,061.0 1.0 64,003.6 0.059 219.1 
1980 2635 20.1 1 16 948,134 948,134.0 1.0 59,258.4 0.063 359.8 
1981 2158 19.6 1 16 966,738 966,738.0 1.0 60,421.1 0.063 448.0 
1982 2208 19.1 1 16 984,136 984,136.0 1.0 61,508.5 0.063 445.7 
1983 2255 18.1 1 16 1,009,881 1,009,881.0 1.0 63,117.6 0.063 447.8 
1984 2382 16.8 1 16 1,010,522 1,010,522.0 1.0 63,157.6 0.063 424.2 
1985 2551 15.7 1 16 1,004,398 1,004,398.0 1.0 62,774.9 0.063 393.7 
1986 2675 15.5 1 16 1,035,890 1,035,890.0 1.0 64,743.1 0.063 387.2 
1987 4103 17.3 1 16 1,267,457 1,267,457.0 1.0 79,216.1 0.063 308.9 
1988 6164 22.0 1 21 1,707,456 1,707,456.0 1.0 81,307.4 0.048 277.0 
1989 7883 23.3 1 21 1,932,415 1,932,415.0 1.0 92,019.8 0.048 245.1 
1990 7698 21.5 1 21 1,886,884 1,886,884.0 1.0 89,851.6 0.048 245.1 
1991 7656 19.1 1 21 1,803,408 1,803,408.0 1.0 85,876.6 0.048 235.6 
1992 7527 17.8 1 21 1,734,598 1,734,598.0 1.0 82,599.9 0.048 230.5 
1993 7147 16.9 1 26 1,667,373 1,667,373.0 1.0 64,129.7 0.038 233.3 
1994 7025 16.1 1 26 1,659,011 1,659,011.0 1.0 63,808.1 0.038 236.2 
1995 6606 15.1 1 26 1,614,800 1,614,800.0 1.0 62,107.7 0.038 244.4 
1996 6424 14.5 1 26 1,598,558 1,598,558.0 1.0 61,483.0 0.038 248.8 
1997 5733 13.3 1 40 1,484,194 1,484,194.0 1.0 37,104.9 0.025 258.9 
1998 5560 13.7 1 42 1,401,940 1,401,940.0 1.0 33,379.5 0.024 252.1 
1999 5637 14.7 2 43 1,480,666 740,333.0 0.5 34,434.1 0.023 262.7 
2000 5698 14.3 2 44 1,526,995 763,497.5 0.5 34,704.4 0.023 268.0 
2001 6150 14.2 2 45 1,568,723 784,361.5 0.5 34,860.5 0.022 255.1 
2002 6506 13.5 2 41 1,538,499 769,249.5 0.5 37,524.4 0.024 236.5 
2003 6257 13.0 2 43 1,549,949 774,974.5 0.5 36,045.3 0.023 247.7 
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national and industrial federations in total union membership.1 That is, 
and industrial federations (C1/C2) and (2) the distribution of union 
members among the various union organizations (C3, C3-1/C4, C4-1).
As regards national confederation concentration (C1) in Korea, only one 
union confederation existed as of the end of the 1980s. The 
confederation, the Federation of Korean Trade Union (FKTU), organized 
every legal enterprise union under its umbrella, even though it was 
dependent on support from the military government. In addition, the 
FKTU was able to monopolize union membership because the labor law 
revisions promoted by the military government prohibited alternative 
unions (the ban on multi-unionism). In short, the concentration at the 
national confederation level in Korea had been preserved until the late 
1980s by the legal regulations imposed by the authoritarian government.
During this period, the concentration by membership size of the union 
confederation (C3) had also been increasing as union membership 
expanded. The relative size of confederation union membership (C3-1) 
remained at 1.0, as total union membership was equal to the one 
confederation’s membership (i.e., membership monopoly).
With regards to the degree of concentration measured by the number of 
industrial federations (C2), it also had been stable, ranging between 16 
and 17 (Table 2), before the late 1980s. The membership of major 
industrial federations steadily increased until the end of the late 1980s, 
and the degree of concentration as measured by federation membership (C4) 
also was steadily increasing. In addition, the relative size of union 
membership enrolled in any of the major industrial federations (C4-1) 
was well balanced in the range of 0.059 and 0.063 before the 1987 
struggle and suing revitalization of the Korean labor movement. 
In our statistical analysis, union concentration in Korea is divided into 
two periods, before and after the late 1980s wave of union militancy 
(Table 2). The data show that in the second period, the union 
confederation and industry concentration scores declined. 
The Korean labor movement was divided along political and 
ideological lines into two confederations in 1997, that is, the FKTU and 
the KCTU. This split involved the mobilization of democratic unionism 
led by a new independent union organization (KCTU). As a result, the 
share of union members enrolled in each confederation (C1 and C2) 
declined. The emergence of two rival confederations also led union 
membership to disperse into new industrial federations (C3 & C4). In 
1 C3-1 = C3 / Total Union Membership, C4-1 = C4 / Total Union Membership
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TABLE 3. REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF UNION CONCENTRATION 
(C1/C2) ON STRIKES
M-1 M-1A M-1B M-1C M-1D M-1E
Predictor Strikes
Lagged 1-year 0.13 ** 0.14 *** 0.15 *** 0.14 ** 0.12 ** 0.16 ***
Year dummy 87 0.85 *** 0.86 *** 0.86 *** 0.86 *** 0.86 *** 0.86 ***
Year dummy 88 0.30 *** 0.29 *** 0.29 *** 0.29 *** 0.30 *** 0.28 ***
Year dummy 89 0.30 *** 0.29 *** 0.29 *** 0.29 *** 0.29 *** 0.30 ***
Confederations(C1) 0.29 *** 0.06 ***
Ind. Federations(C2) -0.08 0.03 *
N of Unions -0.02 0.01
Union Members 0.04 0.03 -0.04 **
Union Density -0.04
Adjusted R-square 0.990 0.990 0.987 0.986 0.987 0.988
N 34 34 34 34 34 34
M-1A-1 M-1A-2 M-1A-3 M-1B-1 M-1B-2 M-1B-3
Predictor Strikes
Lagged 1-year 0.14 ** 0.14 ** 0.16 *** 0.15 ** 0.15 ** 0.17 ***
Year dummy 87 0.86 *** 0.86 *** 0.86 *** 0.86 *** 0.86 *** 0.86 ***
Year dummy 88 0.29 *** 0.29 *** 0.28 *** 0.28 *** 0.28 *** 0.27 ***
Year dummy 89 0.30 *** 0.30 *** 0.29 *** 0.29 *** 0.29 *** 0.29 ***
Confederations(C1) 0.05 ** 0.05 *** 0.06 ***
Ind. Federations(C2) 0.03 0.04 0.05 *
N of Unions -0.06 -0.06 * -0.01 -0.05 -0.06 -0.02
Union Members 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06
Union Density 0.00 -0.01
Adjusted R-square 0.990 0.990 0.989 0.987 0.988 0.987
N 34 34 34 34 34 34
Note: *. P < 0.10, **. P < 0.05, ***. P < 0.01




























































FIGURE 2. UNION CONCENTRATION INDEX (C1 & C2) AND UNION DENSITY RATE
addition, union concentration by membership size also declined in both 
absolute value (C3/C4) and relative value (C3-1/C4-1) terms. 
Figure 2 traces union density and union concentration (C4 in 
particular). While union density has steadily decreased, thenumber of 
industrial federations has continued to increase since 1989 because new 
types of workers have been organized. 
The decrease in union concentration that occurred contributed to 
increasing industrial conflicts because competition for ideological identity 
(seon-myong-sung) between union federations at the confederation- and 
industry-levels increased the possibility of industrial conflicts. The 
tendency for union competition to spur industrial conflicts was well 
demonstrated when various disputes directly followed competitive 
maneuvers between CTU and FKTU over various policy and industrial 
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relations issues. For example, from their formation the KCTU tried to 
persuade the government to legalize multiple unionism at both national 
and firm levels, whereas the FKTU strongly opposed that for fear that 
the reform would wipe out their monopolistic advantage (Song, 1999). 
In addition, after the financial crisis, “both federations participated in 
the Tripartite Commission at the beginning, but the KCTU eventually 
withdrew from the commission as its members strongly denounced the 
leadership’s decision to reach an agreement that made it easier to lay 
off workers.” (Lee and Lee, 2003) These policy differences contributed 
to labor disputes. In the early 1990s the KCTU supported strikes to get 
labor law reforms that would legitimize multiple unionism, and then in 
the late 1990s the KCTU supported strikes that opposed the labor law 
reforms that made lay-offs easier.
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF THE FRAGMENTATION 
IN BARGAINING AND UNION STRUCTURES ON STRIKE FREQUENCY
In our statistical model, we use a simple linear interaction model to 
evaluate the impact of bargaining and union structure on strike 
frequency by controlling for the influence of various other factors on 
strike frequency. We estimate             ,       where S is strike activity 
and x measures bargaining and union fragmentation. 
The data are from archival resources for the period from 1963 through 
2003. The data are annual measures of union concentration and 
membership in each year and other environmental variables that might 
affect strike frequency. The dependent variable is the number of 
industrial disputes. Dummy variables (Year) are included in the model 
to control for the idiosyncratic events that occurred in 1987, 1988 and 
1989, and a lagged (by one year) measure of the dependent variable is 
also incorporated into the model to control for time effects. The results 
of the least square analysis are reported in Tables 3 and 4. 
The first model (M-1 family: M-1 to M-1B-3) was estimated with the 
following independent variables: the number of union confederations 
(i.e., union concentration at the national level; C1), the number of 
industrial federations (i.e., union concentration at the industrial level; 
C2), the number of enterprise unions, union membership, time dummy 
variables, and a lagged dependent variable. The second model (M-2 
family: M-2-1 to M-2D-2) was estimated without C1 and C2 in the M-1 
family of models and with the membership size of union confederations 
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TABLE 4. REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF UNION CONCENTRATION 
(C3/C4, C3-1/C4-1) ON STRIKES
to test for the effect of the size of union confederations and union 
industrial federations. 
In the M-1 family of models, the coefficients on the number of union 
confederations (national-level concentration; C1) and the year dummy 
M-2-1 M-2A-1 M-2A-2 M-2B-1 M-2B-2
Predictor Strikes
Lagged 1-year 0.13 ** 0.19 *** 0.16 *** 0.15 ** 0.14 **
Year dummy 87 0.84 *** 0.86 *** 0.86 *** 0.86 *** 0.86 ***
Year dummy 88 0.31 *** 0.27 *** 0.28 *** 0.29 *** 0.29 ***
Year dummy 89 0.30 *** 0.30 *** 0.29 *** 0.30 *** 0.29 ***
Size of Confederations (C3) -0.17 *** -0.13 *** -0.01
Size of Ind. Federations (C4) 0.11 ** 0.01 0.01
N of Unions 0.02
Union Members 0.05
Union Density -0.06 -0.05 ** -0.04 **
Adjusted R-square 0.991 0.998 0.986 0.988 0.986
N 34 34 34 34 34
M-2-2 M-2C-1 M-2C-2 M-2D-1 M-2D-2
Predictor Strikes
Lagged 1-year 0.13 ** 0.15 *** 0.14 *** 0.16 ** 0.14 **
Year dummy 87 0.85 *** 0.86 *** 0.86 *** 0.85 *** 0.86 ***
Year dummy 88 0.31 *** 0.29 *** 0.28 *** 0.28 *** 0.29 ***
Year dummy 89 0.30 *** 0.30 *** 0.29 *** 0.30 *** 0.29 ***
Relative Size of Conf. (C3-1) -0.09 *** -0.05 *** -0.06 ***
Relative Size of IF. (C4-1) 0.11 ** 0.01 -0.03
N of Unions 0.01
Union Members 0.04
Union Density -0.05 -0.02 -0.05 *
Adjusted R-square 0.991 0.989 0.990 0.988 0.987
N 34 34 34 34 34
Note: *. P < 0.10, **. P < 0.05, ***. P < 0.01
BARGAINING INSTITUTIONS ON STRIKE ACTIVITY 81
variables are all in the predicted direction and are statistically 
significant at the .01 level. The impact of union concentration on the 
frequency of industrial disputes is statistically significant in almost all 
the sub-models (at least at the level of 0.05). Lower union concentration 
at the national level, as expected, produces more labor disputes. This 
indicates that a small number of national confederations is likely to be 
better able to coordinate or at least minimize the impact of intra- or 
inter-organizational conflicts. However, contrary to our expectation, a 
greater number of industrial union federations (C2) is not associated 
with greater strike frequency. Only in Model M-1B and M-1B-3 among 
several sub-models in the M-1 family, does the number of industrial 
union confederation exhibit a statistically significant impact on strike 
statistics.   
The association between the concentration by size of both confederation 
and industrial federation and the strike activities is statistically 
summarized in Table 5 (M-2 family). In the M-2 family model union 
concentration is measured by the membership (size) of union 
confederations and union industrial federations. In the M-2 family, the 
statistical influence of concentration by size (C3/C4 as well as C3-1/C4-1) 
of both union confederations and union industrial federations on strike 
activity is weaker than that of C1 and C2. 
Even though the relative size of union confederations (C3-1) in the 
several sub-models in the M-2 family has a substantial influence on 
strike frequency, this appears to reflect the direct effects of national 
union confederation concentration (C1). That is, the statistical influence 
of C3-1 on strikes is exactly the same as the effect of national-level 
concentration (C1) because the former is the reverse function of the 
latter. 
Another interesting thing is the role of the year dummy variables on 
strike frequency. Whenever they are included in the regression models, 
the year dummy variables are statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level. This indicates there are a number of unmeasured year 
characteristics (structural changes or variations in the time periods) that 
affect the frequency of industrial disputes.
CONCLUSION
In the 1990s in Korea, union concentration at the confederation level 
and the industrial federation level decreased as rival confederation and 
industrial federations were formed by democratic union groups. 
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Overall, our data provide substantial evidence of an association between 
the degree of concentration in national-level unions and strike activity. 
The regression analysis indicates that the greater union monopoly 
(concentration) at the national level is, the lower industrial conflicts are. 
This suggests that where unions’ representative monopoly is greater, 
those unions are able to better coordinate intra- and inter-organizational 
conflicts, and this leads to lower strike frequency. Future research 
should examine whether the same patterns hold in other countries and 
in other time periods.  
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